Over the last decade many emerging economies, and in particular Brazil, have established themselves as major players in global food animal production. Within these countries much of the increase in food animal production has been achieved by the adoption of intensive housing systems similar to those found in most industrialized countries. However, it is now well established that many of these systems are associated with numerous welfare problems, particularly with respect to restriction of movement. Previous work has shown that people (...) living in industrialized’ countries broadly support farm animal welfare reform, and that similar criticisms may be voiced from citizens living in developing countries as they become more aware of confinement housing and potentially contentious husbandry practices. Given the developments that have taken place in other countries, there are lessons that could be learned and applied by emerging economies that would undoubtedly ease or prevent the challenges observed in other countries. Thus, we briefly describe the vehicles used by different countries when addressing animal welfare that may provide insights into identifying possible challenges and potential solutions for Brazil and other emerging economies. Where available we review the associated science and identify gaps where more research is needed. We conclude by providing a possible roadmap on how farm animal welfare reform may be addressed in emerging countries. Solutions will need to be tailored, culturally relevant, and science must play a key role in supporting animal welfare reform in the emerging countries. (shrink)

Public opinion can affect the adoption of genome editing technologies. In food production, genome editing can be applied to a wide range of applications, in different species and with different purposes. This study analyzed how the public responds to five different applications of genome editing, varying the species involved and the proposed purpose of the modification. Three of the applications described the introduction of disease resistance within different species, and two targeted product quality and quantity in cattle. Online surveys in (...) Canada, the US, Austria, Germany and Italy were carried out with a total sample size of 3698 participants. Using a between-subject design, participants were confronted with one of the five applications and asked to decide whether they considered it right or wrong. Perceived risks, benefits, and the perception of the technology as tampering with nature were surveyed and were complemented with socio-demographics and a measure of the participants’ moral foundations. In all countries, participants evaluated the application of disease resistance in humans as most right to do, followed by disease resistance in plants, and then in animals, and considered changes in product quality and quantity in cattle as least right to do. However, US and Italian participants were generally more positive toward all scenarios, and German and Austrian participants more negative. Cluster analyses identified four groups of participants: ‘strong supporters’ who saw only benefits and little risks, ‘slight supporters’ who perceived risks and valued benefits, ‘neutrals’ who showed no pronounced opinion, and ‘opponents’ who perceived higher risks and lower benefits. This research contributes to understanding public response to applications of genome editing, revealing differences that can help guide decisions related to adoption of these technologies. (shrink)

This paper describes the perspectives of stakeholders within the North American dairy industry on key issues affecting the welfare of dairy cattle. Five heterogeneous focus groups were held during a dairy cattle welfare meeting in Guelph, Canada in October 2012. Each group contained between 7 and 10 participants and consisted of a mix of dairy producers, veterinarians, academics, students, and dairy industry specialists. The 1-h facilitated discussions were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Content analysis of the resulting transcripts showed that participants (...) across all stakeholder categories identified lameness as the most important welfare issue facing dairy cattle. Other prominent issues of concern included cow comfort, disease, on-farm mortality, stockmanship, painful procedures, injuries, cull cow management, calf management, and restriction of behavioural freedoms. Participants typically gave several reasons for why they considered issues problematic. Underlying reasons were grouped according to animal-centered concerns [at both the individual and at the herd level ] and industry-centered concerns . This analysis identified areas of shared concern among diverse stakeholder groups, which should aid in the development of standards and policies that satisfy stakeholders within and external to the dairy industry. (shrink)

Calls for public engagement on emerging agricultural technologies, including genetic engineering of farm animals, have resulted in the development of information that people can interact and engage with online, including “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs) developed by organizations seeking to inform or influence the debate. We conducted a frame analysis of FAQs webpages about genetic engineering of farm animals developed by different organizations to describe how questions and answers are presented. We categorized FAQs as having a regulatory frame (emphasizing or challenging (...) the adequacy of regulations), an efficiency frame (emphasizing precision and benefits), a risks and uncertainty frame (emphasizing unknown outcomes), an animal welfare frame (emphasizing benefits for animals) or an animal dignity frame (considering the inherent value of animals). Animals were often featured as the object of regulations in FAQs, and questions about animals were linked to animal welfare regulations. The public were represented using a variety of terms (public, consumer) and pronouns (I, we). Some FAQs described differences between technology terms (gene editing, genetic modification) and categorized technologies as either well-established or novel. This framing of the technology may not respond to actual public concerns on the topic. Organizations seeking to use FAQs as a public engagement tool might consider including multiple viewpoints and actual questions people have about genetic engineering. (shrink)

Several reaction time (RT) studies report faster responses when responses to temporal information are arranged in a spatially congruent manner than when this arrangement is incongruent. The resulting space–time congruency effect is commonly attributed to a culturally salient localization of temporal information along a mental timeline (e.g., a mental timeline that runs from left to right). The present study aims to provide a compilation of the published RT studies on this time–space association in order to estimate the size of its (...) effect and the extent of potential publication bias in this field of research. In this meta-analysis, three types of task are distinguished due to hitherto existing empirical findings. These findings suggest that the extent to which time is made relevant to the experimental task has a systematic impact on whether or not the mental timeline is activated. The results of this meta-analysis corroborate these considerations: First, experiments that make time a task-relevant dimension have a mean effect size of d = 0.46. Second, in experiments in which time is task irrelevant, the effect size does not significantly deviate from zero. Third, temporal priming studies have a surprisingly high mean effect size of d = 0.47, which, however, should be adjusted to d = 0.36 due to publication bias. (shrink)

The relationship between the structural identity of narrative and the truth claim of the historical narrative work is one of importance to Ricœur. He considers the attempts of two interwoven models of history emerging from analytic philosophy—explanatory and narrative—to articulate this relationship. This paper explores the trajectories of these models as well as the epistemological and ontological crises culminating from the “simple” theses of each model. The solution to these crises requires a more complex method to account for the nature (...) of the connections underlying historical understanding. Georg Henrik von Wright’s provisional or “hybrid” model of explanation and understanding revises the simple explanatory model and is foundational for Ricœur’s own complex revision of narrativist models through his notion of questioning back. The present paper argues that the structure of this hybrid model was unsatisfactory for von Wright, and leads in the direction of Ricœur’s own narrative method. Keywords: Ricœur, von Wright, Narrative, History, Questioning back. Résumé La relation entre l’identité structurale du récit et la prétention à la vérité de l’œuvre de récit historique est fondamentale chez Ricœur. Il considère que les deux modèles historiographiques de provenance analytique – le modèle explicatif et le modèle narratif – peuvent s’articuler. Cet article explore les trajectoires de ces modèles autant que les crises épistémologiques et ontologiques qui culminent dans chacune des thèses prise dans un sens unilatéral. La solution pour remédier à ces crises requiert une méthode plus complexe pour tenir compte de la nature des liens qui sous-tendent la compréhension historique. Le modèle d’explication et de compréhension, provisoire et “hybride,” de Georg Henrik von Wright permet de réviser le simple modèle explicatif. Ceci est fondamental pour comprendre la révision complexe que Ricœur apporte aux modèles narrativistes à travers la reprise de la notion de “questionnement à rebours.” La présente contribution fait valoir que la structure de ce modèle hybride n’est pas satisfaisante pour von Wright, et débouche dans le sens de la méthode narrative proposée par Ricœur. Mots-clés: Ricœur, von Wright, Narrative, Histoire, Questionnenement à rebours. (shrink)

Though often stylized as the most transcendent of the arts, music is inseparably linked to politics and society. The essay offers several examples of how even the technical and aesthetic aspects of music have been determined by political factors through the ages. In conclusion, the author turns to the political role of musicology and the current tendency in Germany to transfer academic institutes of musicology to conservatories.

ZusammenfassungDie moderne Religionsgeschichte hat Mazdak, Anführer einer sozioreligiösen Reformbewegung im Sasanidenreich, auf divergierende Weise konzeptualisiert. Insbesondere die diskrepanten Quellenhinweise auf angeblich von Mazdak geforderte Frauen- und Gütergemeinschaften eröffneten Spielraum, eigene, zumeist anachronistische und somit problematische Vorannahmen in Bezug auf das Verhältnis von sogenannten ‚sozialen‘ und ‚religiösen‘ Faktoren der Reformbewegung zu projizieren. Die in Bezug auf Mazdak besonders deutlich hervortretende Problematik nachträglicher Zuschreibungen und narrativer Überlagerungen unterstreicht die grundsätzliche Notwendigkeit, Forschungsgeschichte und Begrifflichkeiten konsequent zu historisieren, und schliesst damit an die übergeordnete (...) Fragestellung an, wie historische Gegenstände (re-)konstruiert werden können. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Text ist der Versuch einer Dekonstruktion der herrschenden ideologischen Annahmen des gegenwärtigen Corona-Diskurses. Er ist der Versuch, diese ideologischen Gedankengänge in ihrer Mangelhaftigkeit darzustellen und ihren ideologischen Charakter zu benennen, sohin der Versuch eines Nachvollzugs des herrschenden Nachdenkens über Corona. Dieses herrschende Nachdenken über Corona und dessen Fortgehen von der einen ideologischen Annahme zur nächsten können als Metamorphosen des pandemischen Bewusstseins bezeichnet werden. Seinen Ausgangspunkt nimmt das pandemische Bewusstsein bei der Diagnose des krisenhaften Charakters der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft, dem (...) es eine „alte Normalität“ entgegenimaginiert. Hier betreibt es eine Rechtfertigung des alten, in dessen Krisencharakter jedoch nicht durchschauten, Zustandes der Gesellschaft. In Sehnsucht nach der Idylle der präpandemischen Gesellschaft entwirft es eine „solidarische“ Gemeinschaft gegen die Bedrohung durch einen äußeren Feind und konstituiert sich also negativ als homogenes Ganzes. Seine Sehnsucht wird zur Harmoniebedürftigkeit im Hier und Jetzt, die es sich durch seinen Glauben an die gute Herrschaft zu stillen weiß, wenn es sich über die Unverhältnismäßigkeit der staatlich verordneten Corona-Maßnahmen echauffiert. Dabei fühlt es sich durch den staatlichen Appell an den gesunden Menschenverstand im täglichen Umgang mit Corona bestätigt und lauscht in aufklärerischem Ethos seiner ewigen Vernunftfähigkeit. In dialektischer Akrobatik veranstaltet es das pandemische Bewusstsein, in der Isolation eine neue Form der Solidarität, das Glück im Unglück zu entdecken, ohne zu erkennen, dass es damit seine Rückkehr zum „Normalzustand“ der bürgerlichen als einer warenproduzierenden Gesellschaft vollzogen hat. Mit gutem Gewissen enthält es sich eines kritischen Urteils über die Corona-Krise und resigniert staatstreu vor der Einsicht in die Wirklichkeit. So lässt es sich gut regieren. (shrink)

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in (...) epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is (...) that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: What makes knowingp better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life. (shrink)

In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply (...) to authority in the moral and religious domains. (shrink)

These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy.

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is (...) that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowingpis better than merely truly believingp, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowingpbetter than merely truly believingp? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life. (shrink)

Knowledge is a highly valued state in which a person is in cognitive contact with reality. It is, therefore, a relation. On one side of the relation is a conscious subject, and on the other side is a portion of reality to which the knower is directly or indirectly related. While directness is a matter of degree, it is convenient to think of knowledge of things as a direct form of knowledge in comparison to which knowledge about things is indirect. (...) The former has often been called knowledge by acquaintance since the subject is in experiential contact with the portion of reality known, whereas the latter is propositional knowledge since what the subject knows is a true proposition about the world. Knowing Roger is an example of knowledge by acquaintance, while knowing that Roger is a philosopher is an example of propositional knowledge. Knowledge by acquaintance includes not only knowledge of persons and things, but also knowledge of my own mental states. In fact, the knower's own mental states are often thought to be the most directly knowable portion of reality. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of beliefs which (...) it is not wrong to hold unconscientiously. I also argue that epistemic values enjoy a privileged place in the panorama of what we care about because they are entailed by anything we care about. That means that when there is a conflict between caring about knowledge or true belief and caring about something else, that conflict cannot be resolved simply by following the one we care about the most because caring about knowledge in any domain is entailed by caring about that domain. Finally, I argue that whereas caring demands different degrees of conscientiousness in different contexts, contextualism about knowledge is less plausible. (shrink)

Abstract: In this essay I outline a radical kind of virtue theory I call exemplarism, which is foundational in structure but which is grounded in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which anchors all the moral concepts in the theory. I compare several different kinds of moral theory by the way they relate the concepts of the good, a right act, and a virtue. In the theory I propose, these concepts, along with the concepts of a duty and of (...) a good life, are defined by reference to exemplars, identified directly through the emotion of admiration, not through a description. It is an advantage of the theory that what makes a good person good is not given a priori but is determined by empirical investigation. The same point applies to what good persons do and what states of affairs they aim at. The theory gives an important place to empirical investigation and narratives about exemplars analogous to the scientific investigation of natural kinds in the theory of direct reference. (shrink)

Offering both a discussion of feminism in its postmodern context and a critique of contemporary theory, the author here challenges feminists to move away from a theory-based approach, which focuses on securing or contesting "women" as an ...

This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert that the (...) intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is is this category. It has the form "That is A" (pitiful, contemptible, rude, etc.). Such judgments combine the features of cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism, an advantage that explains why we find moral weakness problematic in spite of its ubiquity. I then outline a process I call "thinning" the judgment, which explains how moral strength, weakness, and apathy arise. I argue that this process is necessary for moral reasoning and communication, in spite of its disadvantage in disengaging the agent's motivating emotion from the judgment. (shrink)

A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy ...

Abstract:Previous research has identified multiple approaches to the design and implementation of corporate ethics programs (Paine, 1994; Weaver, Treviño, and Cochran, in press b; Treviño, Weaver, Gibson, and Toffler, in press). This field survey in a large financial services company investigated the relationships of the values and compliance orientations in an ethics program to a diverse set of outcomes. Employees’ perceptions that the company ethics program is oriented toward affirming ethical values were associated with seven outcomes. Perceptions of a compliance (...) orientation were associated with four of these outcomes. The interaction of values and compliance orientations was associated with employees’ willingness to report misconduct. In general, a values orientation makes a greater unique contribution to the measured outcomes when compared to a compliance orientation. (shrink)

The category of the admirable has received little attention in the history of philosophy, even among virtue ethicists. I don't think we can understand the admirable without investigating the emotion of admiration. I have argued that admiration is an emotion in which the object is ‘seen as admirable’, and which motivates us to emulate the admired person in the relevant respect. Our judgements of admirability can be distorted by the malfunction of our disposition to admiration. We all know many ways (...) in which admiration misfires when people admire someone who is not admirable. In this paper I focus on a different kind of mistake, one in which there is resistance to moving from admiring to emulating someone admirable. I think that Aristotle's zēlos is in between admiration and envy, and it points us to a predictable line of deviation from admiration to the path of envy, spite and ressentiment. I think these are mistakes to which people in the modern age are particularly prone. (shrink)

This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and the differences (...) between divine and human knowing states. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma that purports to show that omniscient foreknowledge conflicts with deep intuitions about temporal asymmetry, quite apart from considerations of free will. Zagzebski shows that only a narrow range of solutions can handle this new dilemma. A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Persons are thought to have a special kind of value, often called "dignity," which, according to Kant, makes them both infinitely valuable and irreplaceably valuable. The author aims to identify what makes a person a person in a way that can explain both aspects of dignity. She considers five definitions of "person": (1) an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius), (2) a self-conscious being (Locke), (3) a being with the capacity to act for ends (Kant), (4) a being with (...) the capacity to act for another (Kant), and (5) an incommunicably unique subject (Wojtyla). She argues that none is capable of grounding both aspects of dignity since they are incompatible kinds of value; it is impossible for the same thing to ground both. Human persons are infinitely valuable in virtue of shareable qualities of their nature, whereas they are irreplaceably valuable because of a nonqualitative feature of their personhood. (shrink)

[7]. 184-211 De animabus. A cura di Loris Sturlese.

Dieses R-Arbeitsbuch bietet seinen Leserinnen und Lesern ökonometrische Übungsaufgaben, die eigenständig am Computer bearbeitet werden können. Die notwendigen Kenntnisse des kostenlosen Programmpakets R werden in,,R-Boxen" quasi nebenbei Schritt für Schritt vermittelt. Den Auftakt bildet dabei eine einfache Installationsanleitung. Auch alle Lösungen der Übungsaufgaben sind sorgfältig dokumentiert. Das R-Arbeitsbuch lässt sich zwar mit jedem einführenden Ökonometrie-Lehrbuch kombinieren, die optimale Verzahnung besteht jedoch mit dem Lehrbuch Ökonometrie - Eine Einführung (von Auer, 8. Auflage, 2023). Die Zielgruppe dieser Lehrbuch-Arbeitsbuch-Kombination besitzt weder statistische oder (...) ökonometrische Kenntnisse noch Erfahrung in der Anwendung statistischer Programme. Für die 2. Auflage wurde das R-Arbeitsbuch gründlich überarbeitet und um zusätzliche Aufgaben ergänzt. Der Inhalt Ökonometrische Übungsaufgaben zur eigenständigen Bearbeitung Detaillierte Lösungen zu den Übungsaufgaben Systematische Anleitung für den Umgang mit dem Programmpaket R Die Autoren Ludwig von Auer ist Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Trier. Er wurde von der Studentenschaft mit zahlreichen Preisen für herausragende Lehre ausgezeichnet und erhielt 2014 den Lehrpreis der Universität Trier. Sönke Hoffmann ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg, sowie selbständig tätiger Dozent an der Otto-von-Guericke Business School Magdeburg. Seit 2013 unterrichtet er Ökonometrie in Verbindung mit Statistiksoftware und entwickelte in diesem Zusammenhang das R-Paket desk. Tobias Kranz ist Dozent im Fach Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Trier. Die Ökonometrie gehört seit 2016 zu seinem Lehrportfolio. Im Jahr 2021 erhielt er den Lehrpreis der Universität Trier. Seit 2022 ist er Mitautor des R-Pakets desk. (shrink)

This paper delineates the normative and empirical approaches to business ethics based upon five categories: 1) academic horne; 2) language; 3) underlying assumptions; 4) theory purpose and scope; 5) theory grounds and evaluation criteria. The goal of the discussion is to increase understanding of the distinctive contributions of each approach and to encourage further dialogue about the potential for integration of the field.

Senior managers are important to the successful management of ethics in organizations. Therefore, their perceptions of organizational ethics are important. In this study, we propose that senior managers are likely to have a more positive perception of organizational ethics than lower level employees do largely because of their managerial role and their corresponding identification with the organization and need to protect the organization’s image as well as their own identity. By contrast, lower level employees are more likely to be cynical (...) about the organization’s ethics. In order to compare senior managers’ and lower level employees’ perceptions of ethics in the organization, we surveyed randomly selected senior managers and lower level employees in three firms. We found that perceptions of ethics in the organization differed predictably across levels, with senior managers’ perceptions being significantly more positive and lower level employees’ perceptions being more negative. Implications for practice and research are discussed. (shrink)

Abstract:Analysis of ethical conduct of business organizations has hitherto placed primary emphasis on the conduct of that corporation’s managers because ethical conduct, like all conduct, must manifest itself through individual behavior. This paper argues that in the real world corporate actions are influenced, to a considerable extent, by external market-based conditions. Therefore, a more comprehensive explanation of ethical business conduct must incorporate both corporate, i.e., internal considerations, and competitive, industry structure-based, i.e., external considerations. A framework is presented that provides a (...) systematic analysis of the interactive effect between different types of external market-based competitive conditions, institutional opportunities to engage in ethical behavior, and the likelihood that corporations would do so. The analytical framework leads to recommendations as to the types of actions that might be more effective in improving business ethical conduct under varying sets of market-based competitive conditions. (shrink)

How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to (...) put moral pressure on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish. Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction My Theory of Moral Theory The Structure of Some Moral Theories Exemplarism A Comprehensive Exemplarist Virtue Theory References.

Anthropologists have provided rich field descriptions of the norms and conventions governing behavior and interactions in small-scale societies. Here, we add a further dimension to this work by presenting hypothetical moral dilemmas involving harm, to a small-scale, agrarian Mayan population, with the specific goal of exploring the hypothesis that certain moral principles apply universally. We presented Mayan participants with moral dilemmas translated into their native language, Tseltal. Paralleling several studies carried out with educated subjects living in large-scale, developed nations, the (...) Mayan participants judged harms caused as the means to a greater good as more forbidden than harms caused as a side-effect (i.e., side-effect bias). However, unlike these other populations living in large-scale societies, as well as a more educated and less rural Mayan comparison group, the target rural Mayan participants did not judge actions causing harm as worse than omissions (i.e., omission bias). A series of probes targeting the action-omission distinction suggest that the absence of an omission bias among the rural Mayan participants was not due to difficulties comprehending the dilemmas, using the judgment scale, or in attributing a greater causal role for actions over omissions. Thus, while the moral distinction between means and side-effect may be more universal, the moral distinction between actions and omission appears to be open to greater cross-cultural variation. We discuss these results in light of issues concerning the role of biological constraints and cultural variation in moral decision-making, as well as the limitations of such experimental, cross-cultural research. (shrink)

We argue that dominant research approaches concerning mental illness, which are centered on traditional categories of psychiatric classification as codified in the DSM-IV, have serious empirical, conceptual, and foundational problems. These problems have led to a classification scheme and body of research findings that provide a very poor map of the domain of mental illness, a map that, in turn, undermines clinical and research pursuits. We discuss some current efforts to respond to these problems and argue that the DSM-5 revision (...) process is not very promising, whereas the NIMH Research Domain Criteria initiative and some recent research in cognitive neuroscience fares better, although the latter remains potentially compromised by residual influences of the DSM-based approach. We conclude with some lessons and suggestions for the pursuit of alternative research pathways. (shrink)